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not find better work. Irrespective of the measure of regulation we use, we always find a detrimental
effect of regulation on entrepreneurship. While women are overall less likely to start new businesses,
in more regulated countries women are pulled into entrepreneurship not to pursue a business opportunity
but because they could not find better work. Moreover, regulation dampens the effects of self-assessed
business skills and social networks. In more regulated economies, those with better business skills
and those who know other entrepreneurs are less likely to become entrepreneurs to pursue a business
opportunity. Tighter regulation also exacerbates fear of failure, further discouraging business start-up.
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Abstract
We use two micro data sets that collect harmonized data across coun-
tries to investigate the effects of regulation on new businesses. We are able
to distinguish between two types of entrepreneurs: those who start a busi-
ness to pursue a business opportunity and those who start a business because
they could not ﬁnd better work. Irrespective of the measure of regulation
we use, we always ﬁnd a detrimental effect of regulation on entrepreneur-
ship. While women are overall less likely to start new businesses, in more
regulated countries women are pulled into entrepreneurship not to pursue a
business opportunity but because they could not ﬁnd better work. Moreover,
regulation dampens the effects of self-assessed business skills and social net-
works. In more regulated economies, those with better business skills and
those who know other entrepreneurs are less likely to become entrepreneurs
to pursue a business opportunity. Tighter regulation also exacerbates fear of
failure, further discouraging business start-up. All our estimates point to a
negative effect of regulation.
1 Introduction
A growing body of academic and policy work emphasizes the importance of entre-
preneurs and of countries’ regulatory and legal environment for economic growth
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1and development. As Aghion and Howitt (1997) suggest, new entrepreneurial ac-
tivities play avital part in the process of creative destructionthatfostersinnovation,
employment, and growth. One way in which the regulatory and legal environment
can impact growth and employment is its effect on the rate at which new busi-
nesses are created. While entrepreneurship has been so far largely treated as a
homogeneous phenomenon, Ardagna and Lusardi (2008b) show that entrepreneurs
differ widely in terms of personal characteristics, motivation to start new enter-
prises, types of businesses created, and ability to contribute to countries’ growth
anddevelopment. Moreover, entrepreneurshipisnotalwaysadesiredactivityatthe
individual level, and individuals for whom entrepreneurship is a necessity/remedial
activity may wish to exit entrepreneurship and work for an employer.
Mostly because of data limitation, there is a lack of research on the effect of
economic policies on different types of entrepreneurship. Certain types of eco-
nomic policies may be recommended because they support the creation of new
businesses. However, not much is known about whether these policies support the
type of entrepreneurship that is most beneﬁcial for both the macroeconomy and in-
dividual well-being, or whether they simply foster self-employment in low-skilled,
low-paid sectors. From a policy perspective, it is important to be able to distin-
guish between these cases. In this paper, we aim to enhance our knowledge of the
individual characteristics and economic policies that encourage different types of
entrepreneurship activities.
We focus on a speciﬁc set of economic policies - entry regulation in prod-
uct markets, regulation of contract enforcement, and labor market regulation - and
we investigate how regulation in these areas impacts two very distinct types of
entrepreneurs: those who want to become entrepreneurs to pursue a business op-
portunity (opportunity entrepreneurs) and those who undertake entrepreneurship
because they cannot ﬁnd a better alternative (remedial/necessity entrepreneurs).
We begin our analysis by introducing regulation in a static occupational choice
model based on the work of Lucas (1978) and Evans and Jovanovic (1989). We
study both the direct and indirect effect of regulation on the individual decision to
start a new business, via the effect of regulation on the return of a wide-ranging set
of individual characteristics, including business skills, fear of failure, and social
networks. We then take our model to the data to test its implications.
Because our model relies on individual characteristics of entrepreneurs, we use
cross-national harmonized micro data on entrepreneurship collected by Global En-
trepreneurship Monitor (GEM) in 40 developed and developing countries, and we
merge these data with cross country macro data on regulation to capture differ-
ences in regulatory constraints. We also perform our analysis on a smaller sample
of countries using micro data from the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys on Entrepre-
neurship collected by the European Commission.
2Irrespective of the data sets and measure of regulation we use, we ﬁnd that
regulation is a detriment to entrepreneurial activity, particularly for those individu-
als who become entrepreneurs to pursue a business opportunity. Our results show
that regulation affects the individual decision to start a new business by changing
the return of certain personal characteristics. In more heavily regulated countries,
those who have business skills, know other entrepreneurs, and have less fear of
failure are, in fact, less likely to engage in entrepreneurship than in less regulated
countries. Moreover, in countries with higher regulation, women and those who
do not work are more likely to be pulled into necessity entrepreneurship. Since
women and the unemployed are already vulnerable groups, regulation can end up
having truly harmful effects.
Our estimates also point to some alternative ways in which entrepreneurship
can be supported. Raising education is among the most effective policies to foster
entrepreneurship. Increasing educational attainment can achieve several important
objectives: not only does education foster entrepreneurship but it pulls would-be
entrepreneurs into pursuing business opportunity while it discourages necessity
entrepreneurship. Related to education, we also ﬁnd that those who have business
skillsaremorelikelytoenterentrepreneurship. Thus, teachingorfosteringrelevant
skills in school or in training programs may be another way to foster entrepreneur-
ship. Finally, peers and social networks are also important for entrepreneurship.
Therefore, encouraging or creating business clusters could also jump-start entre-
preneurship. Once again, these effects are greater for those who engage in oppor-
tunity entrepreneurship, the type of entrepreneurship that is more beneﬁcial for the
macroeconomy and individual well-being.
This paper contributes to two distinct strands of literature: the entrepreneurship
literatureandtheinstitutionalliterature. Intheentrepreneurshipliterature, thereare
relatively few studies that investigate the factors affecting individual decisions to
engage in new entrepreneurial activity in a broad sample of countries. Most of
the literature uses micro data from one particular country, the United States in the
majority of the cases. Also, with the exception of Djankov et al. (2005), (2006a),
(2006b), and (2008), who investigate the role of a broad set of macro and micro
variables on entrepreneurship in Russia, China, and Brazil, empirical research has
focused on a limited number of individual characteristics.1 Moreover, while the
literature has focused on tax policy and liquidity constraints,2 our paper looks at
1See, for example, the papers by Blanchﬂower (2000, 2004), Blanchﬂower, Oswald, and Stutzer
(2001), and Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998), and the review in Hurst and Lusardi (2004, 2008).
2See, for example, the work by Djankov et al. (2007), Gentry and Hubbard (2000), Evans and
Jovanovic (1989), Guiso et al. (2004), Hurst and Lusardi (2004, 2008). See also Alfaro and Charlton
(2007) for the effects of international ﬁnancial integration on entrepreneurship and Malesky and
Taussig (2008) for the effect of quality of governance institutions on entrepreneurship in Vietnam.
3other types of regulation, such as the regulation of the product and labor markets
and contract enforcement. In this respect, our paper relates to the work of Ciccone
and Papaioannou (2006), Desai et al. (2003), Klapper et al. (2006), and Guiso
and Schivardi (2007), who investigate the role of regulation in product markets on
industries’ entry rates and on several other ﬁrm characteristics using ﬁrm level data
from developed and transitional countries. Finally, in the institutional literature,
there is quite a large body of evidence on the effects of regulation of product and
labor markets on GDP growth, TFP, investment, and employment using macro
data.3 However, less work has been done on how a country’s regulatory and legal
environment affects decisions at the micro level, as we do in this paper.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model; Section 3
describes our data and presents some descriptive statistics; Section 4 discusses
the empirical methodology and our results; Section 5 includes a discussion of our
ﬁndings and the last section concludes.
2 The model
We use a simple model to show the effect of regulation on the individual decision
to engage in a new entrepreneurial activity. The model is static and extends the
work of Lucas (1978) and Evans and Jovanovic (1989) by introducing regulation
and considering its impact on entrepreneurship both directly and via the interaction
between countries’ regulation and individual characteristics. As we show below,
this extension is important because regulation can also affect the return on certain
individual characteristics such as education, business skills, and attitude toward
risk.
At the beginning of each period, a risk-neutral individual has to decide whether
to continue his current employment status or to start a new business activity. His
current employment status yields him an income y that is exogenous and indepen-
dent of his individual characteristics. The new business, instead, yields him gross
returns equal to y = H Akα where y is output, k is the amount of capital invested in
the business activity, and α<1 is the capital share. For simplicity, we assume that
output is produced using capital as the only factor of production. However, we can
explicitly account for labor in the production process using a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function as, for example, in Guiso and Schivardi (2007), and the results we
obtain below do not change. Finally, H A measures the entrepreneur’s productivity
in the new business. To describe the entrepreneurial technology, we follow Lucas
(1978) and assume that H A = AXβ. A is the entrepreneur’s talent or ability and is
3See Alesina et al. (2005), Bassanini and Ernst (2002), Bayoumi et al. (2004), Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000), Fiori et al. (2007), Loayza et al. (2004), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).
4drawn from a random variable with distribution function γ (A) and corresponding
cumulative distribution function  (A); X captures observable individual charac-
teristics such as age, gender, education, social networks, business skills, and risk
attitude; ∂H A
∂X > 0, ∂J 2A
∂X2 < 0a n dβ<1.
Regulation imposes a cost C = f +vk composed of a ﬁxed component f and
of a variable part v proportional to the amount of capital invested in the business.
The sunk cost component captures administrative procedures and other costs (e.g.,
costs for licenses) that the entrepreneur has to incur to be able to start the business
activity. The variable component, instead, measures other costs that the regulatory
burden can impose on ﬁrms. For example, in a country in which the legal system is
n o tf a i ro re f ﬁcient, going to court can be very costly for ﬁrms and it seems reason-
able to assume that such costs are proportional to the amount of capital invested.4
2.1 The entrepreneur’s problem
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Substituting equation (2) and the equation that describes the entrepreneurial
technology H A = AXβ in the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function gives an expression for the
optimal level of proﬁts the entrepreneur expects at the beginning of the period as a
function of the entrepreneur’s talent A, his characteristics X, the interest rate r,t h e
parameters capturing the costs imposed by regulation, f and v, and the technology
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Ceteris paribus, an increase in the entrepreneur’s productivity (due to both an
increase in A or in X) leads to an increase in the optimal level of expected proﬁts,
while an increase in v or f leads to a decrease in E (π∗). Moreover, note that in an
environment in which the regulatory burden is heavier (v is higher), an increase of
4If we explicitly account for labor in the production process as, for example, in Guiso and
Schivardi (2007), regulatory costs can be assumed to be proportional to labor as well, and this could
be a simple way to capture the costs imposed by labor regulation.
5the entrepreneur’s productivity leads to a lower increase in E (π∗) than in a country
in which v is lower (i.e.
∂2E(π∗)
∂A∂v < 0a n d
∂2E(π∗)
∂X∂v < 0). Suppose, for example, that
the entrepreneur’s productivity in the new business is higher the more educated the
entrepreneur is or the higher the amount of social capital he has accumulated (i.e.,
X is higher). If the entrepreneur acquires an additional year of education or invests
his time to build up more social capital, the beneﬁts from such activities, measured
in terms of proﬁt from his new business, are lower in more regulated countries.
2.2 The decision to start a new business
An individual chooses to start a new entrepreneurial activity if he expects that the
net income from doing so will be higher than the income he receives from his
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Because E (π∗) is increasing in A and because we are assuming that y does
not depend on A, there will be a unique value of A = A at which the marginal
individual is indifferent between remaining in his current occupation or starting
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Equation (5) deﬁnes the level of A above which it is optimal for the individual
to engage in entrepreneurship: higher ability individuals (i.e.: those whose A > A)
choose to start a new entrepreneurial activity, the others do not. An increase in
the regulatory burden, measured both by its ﬁxed component f or by its variable
component v, increases the level of talent above which it is optimal to start a new
business (∂A
∂f > 0, ∂A
∂v > 0). To the contrary, an increase in X decreases the level of
talent above which it is optimal to start a new business (∂A
∂X < 0).
Finally, we can compute how changes in regulation and in individual charac-
teristics inﬂuence the individual probability of starting a new business. First, the
individual probability of starting a new business is decreasing in the regulatory
burden and increasing in X:
∂
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Furthermore, note that the individual probability of starting a new business de-









 =− 1w h e r eηγ(A),A is
the elasticity of the density function with respect to the entrepreneur’s talent com-
puted at the threshold value A. More speciﬁcally, an increase in the regulatory
burden, due either to an increase of its ﬁxed component f or its variable part v,
reduces the positive effect of personal characteristic X on the likelihood of engag-
ing in entrepreneurship if ηγ(A),A < −1 and it increases the positive effect of X if
ηγ(A),A > −1.
Note that for many continuous density functions, this condition translates to a
condition on the derivative of A with respect to the regulation parameters f and
v being larger/smaller than some particular values. If A is normally distributed,
then5




























Hence, a sufﬁcient condition for heavier regulation to lead to a reduction of the
positive effect that an increase in X has on the likelihood of engaging in entrepre-
neurship is that an increase in the regulatory burden (i.e., higher f or v)increases
the level of talent above which it is optimal for an individual to start a new business
by more than 1−α
[y+ f] or α
[r+v] respectively.
Summarizing, in the context of the simple model above, an increase in the reg-
ulatory burden inﬂuences entrepreneurship through two channels. First, a higher
value of f or v leads to a decrease of the probability that an individual will start
a new business activity because it decreases expected proﬁts from the new activity
and increases the productivity level above which it is optimal for an individual to
engage in entrepreneurship. Second, heavier regulation has an indirect effect on
the likelihood of engaging in entrepreneurship via the interaction between coun-
tries’ regulation and individual characteristics. When an increase in the regulatory
burden raises substantially the level of talent above which it is optimal for an indi-
vidual to engage in entrepreneurship, heavier regulation moderates the effect of the
5One obtains similar conditions if A is distributed according to a gamma, Weibull, exponential,
or logistic distribution.
7entrepreneur’s observable characteristics on the probability of starting a new busi-
ness activity. While the direct effect of regulation on entrepreneurship is negative,
the indirect effect that regulation has on the likelihood of engaging in entrepreneur-
ship via the interaction between countries’ regulation and individual characteristics
is ambiguous and depends on parameters’ values. Overall, whether regulation has
ab e n e ﬁcial or detrimental effect on the individual decision to start a new business
activity has to be determined empirically and the scope of the empirical analysis
that follows is precisely to understand whether entrepreneurship ﬂourishes in more
or in less regulated environments.
3 Data: GEM and the Flash Eurobarometer
In order to test the implications of our model we need micro data on entrepreneur-
ship, as our model relies on the individual characteristics of entrepreneurs. More-
over, we need data across countries to capture differences in regulatory constraints.
We use survey data collected by Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) and the
Flash Eurobarometer.
GEMisaresearchprogramthatstartedin1998andthatannuallycollectscross-
national harmonized data on entrepreneurship. This is one of the few surveys that
provide data on entrepreneurship across countries and a rich set of characteristics
on entrepreneurs. Each year GEM surveys either by phone or face-to-face inter-
views a sample of at least 2,000 randomly selected individuals in each country (the
Adult Population Survey).6 The surveys we use refer to the years 2001, 2002, and
2003. These are the most recent surveys available to researchers and include in-
formation both on individuals’ decisions to engage in entrepreneurial activity and
on individuals’ motivations to start a new business. Countries included in our sam-
ple cover a wide spectrum, from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries to Latin American, European and Central Asian
(ECA), and East Asian and Paciﬁc (EPA) countries.7
GEM surveys offer several advantages for our work. First, it reports harmo-
nized data on entrepreneurship across many countries. This is very important since
there are many different deﬁnitions of entrepreneurship both within and across
6See Reynolds et al. (2005) for more information on the GEM project and the data collection
process.
7The complete list is Argentina, Australia, Belgiu m ,B r a z i l ,C a n a d a ,C h i l e ,C h i n a ,C r o a t i a ,D e n -
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Uganda, United Kingdom,
United States, and Venezuela.
8countries and it is critical to be able to make consistent comparisons.8 Second, it
allows us to distinguish between two very distinct types of entrepreneurs: those
who want to become entrepreneurs to pursue a business opportunity (opportunity
entrepreneurs hereafter) and those who undertake entrepreneurship because they
cannot ﬁnd a better alternative (remedial/necessity entrepreneurs hereafter). The
ability to distinguish between "opportunity" and "necessity" entrepreneurs is cru-
cial for our empirical analysis. On the one hand, our model relies on the fact that
an individual chooses to start a new entrepreneurial activity if he expects that the
net income from doing so will be higher than the income he receives from his
current occupation. Hence, opportunity entrepreneur seems to be an ideal char-
acterization of those who set up a business in our model. On the other hand, we
work with a variety of countries, and incentives to become entrepreneurs are very
different between, for example, developed and developing countries. Moreover,
entrepreneurship is not always a desired activity either at the individual or at the
macro level.9 Individuals for whom entrepreneurship is a necessity may wish to
exit entrepreneurship and work for an employer. Similarly, policies that simply
support remedial/necessity entrepreneurship may end up being counterproductive.
Third, GEM provides a rich set of characteristics to study entrepreneurship, such
as attitudes toward risk, self-assessed business skills, and relationship with other
entrepreneurs. These are critical variables to explain entrepreneurship and are not
present in many other cross-national surveys.
We also use data from the Flash Eurobarometer survey. This survey reports in-
formation similar to that reported by GEM. It collects data on entrepreneurship
across developed, Eastern European, and transitional economies10 over several
years, starting with 2000. We use only the 2004 and 2007 surveys because they
are the only ones that include information both on individuals’ decisions to engage
in entrepreneurial activity and individuals’ motivations to start a new business, al-
lowing us to separate necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs, as in GEM data. In
Flash Eurobarometer, the number of observations for each country is often smaller
than in GEM data. Moreover, relative to GEM data, Flash Eurobarometer provides
a less rich set of characteristics to study entrepreneurship. For example, it is not
8See, amongothers, Blanchﬂower(2004), EvansandJovanovic(1989), HurstandLusardi(2004),
Gentry and Hubbard (2000).
9For example, according to Mondragon-Velez and Pena-Parga (2008), many of those who enter
self-employment in Colombia earn low returns. Similar results are reported in Sri Lanka (de Melo,
McKenzie and Woodruff (2008)).
10The complete list is Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United King-
dom, and United States.
9possible to investigate whether self-assessed business skills are important for en-
trepreneurship because the information is not available in the data. However, we
use these data both to check and validate our results from GEM and, as explained
in Section 4, to be able to test all the predictions on the effect of regulation on
entrepreneurship that the model in Section 3 delivers.
As explained in detail in Ardagna and Lusardi (2008a), we have performed
a thorough analysis to assess the quality and reliability of the data. We have
compared GEM data with the Flash Eurobarometer Survey on Entrepreneurship
to check consistency of results between these two surveys. We ﬁnd that the statis-
tics about entrepreneurship between these two surveys match very well. Moreover,
we have estimated the probability of starting a business as a function of a set of
demographic characteristics that are available in GEM and Flash Eurobarometer
data both by country and by year. We have examined whether the estimates from
theseregressionsareconsistent with theresultsfromotherstudiesonspeciﬁccoun-
tries. For example, we have compared these regressions with the estimates of other
studies in the United States and found very similar results. We have also found
consistent results for countries like Italy, Brazil, and China, where data was col-
lected using questions similar to those present in GEM and/or Flash Eurobarometer
surveys. Finally, we have analyzed the data for each country across years to ex-
amine whether there are any major changes or anomalous results, but we found
that the data is consistent across years in the majority of countries included in the
datasets.11
3.1 Entrepreneurship and regulation: Descriptive evidence
GEM and Flash Eurobarometer provide information on total entrepreneurial activ-
ity (TEA). TEAis an indicator variable equal to one if individuals are starting a
new business or are owners and managers of a young ﬁrm; it is equal to zero oth-
erwise. TEAcan be further split into entrepreneurial type: opportunity entrepre-
neurial activity (TEAOPP) and necessity entrepreneurial activity (TEANEC).
TEAOPPis an indicator variable equal to one if individuals are starting a new
11See Ardagna and Lusardi (2008a) for a detailed discussion of the quality of data. In particular,
for the GEM data, Reynolds et al. (2005) compare GEM national annual new ﬁrms’ estimates and
new ﬁrms’ birth rates with data from the Ofﬁcial New Firm Census and data from the European
Commission Report. They show that the entrepreneurship indices computed using GEM data are
reliable and capture the creation of new ﬁrms on a scale comparable to that resulting from the use
of other national administrative datasets. Acs et al. (2007) compare GEM data with the World
Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey (WBGES) data set, which collected data on formal business
registrations of limited liability corporations (LLCs) in 84 countries from 2003 to 2005. The authors
report a number of differences in the two data sets. However, as discussed in Ardagna and Lusardi
(2008a), the differences are mostly due to the deﬁnitions of entrepreneurship used in the two surveys.
10business or are owners and managers of a young ﬁrm to take advantage of a busi-
ness opportunity; it is equal to zero otherwise. TEANECis an indicator variable
equal to one if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers
of a young ﬁrm because they could ﬁnd no better economic work; it is equal to zero
otherwise.12 T h u s ,o u rf o c u si so nﬁrms at the initial planning or inception stage.
Our data represents the potential supply of entrepreneurs rather than the actual rate
of entrepreneurship. This is a speciﬁcd e ﬁnition that differs from what other papers
have used so far, but it is appropriate given the focus of this paper, because it allows
us to concentrate on the start-up phase and on the ﬁrst few years of a new business,
rather than on well-established ﬁrms that have been active for many years and upon
which, for example, the regulatory environment can have different effects.13
To assess the effects of regulation, we add data on countries’ institutional and
regulatory environments. We follow the work of Loayza et al. (2004), and con-
struct indices on several aspects of market regulation.14 In particular, we focus on
entry regulatory indicators for the product markets, regulation of contract enforce-
ment (indicators measuring the efﬁciency of the justice system in resolving legal
disputes), and labor market regulation. While these aspects of regulation do not
cover all regulatory and economic policies, they include some of the most impor-
tant regulatory constraints across countries.
The indices we use in our empirical work are as follows:
Entry: The entry index measures the barriers and costs entrepreneurs face
when they decide to create a new business. It is the average of the number of
12GEM deﬁnes as individuals starting a new business those who (i) alone or with others are cur-
rently trying to start a new business, including any type of self-employment, or (ii) alone or with
o t h e r sa r et r y i n gt os t a r tan e wb u s i n e s so ran e wv e nture together with their employer as an effort
that is part of their normal work, and who (a) have been active in the past 12 months in trying to start
the new business, (b) expect to own part of it, and (c) have not paid salaries and wages to anybody,
including the owner/managers, for more than 3 months. Individuals who are owners and managers
of a young ﬁrm are individuals who, alone or with others, are the owners of a company they help
manage, provided that the company has been paying salaries and wages for no more than 42 months.
Flash Eurobarometer deﬁnes as individuals starting a new business those who (i) are currently taking
steps to start a new business, or (ii) have started or taken over a business in the last three years and
the business is still active at the time of the interview. Appendix II reports the survey questions that
the GEM coordination team uses to generate the variables TEA , TEAOPP, TEANEC.T h ee x -
act methodology is based on procedures previously used in the U.S Panel Study of Entrepreneurial
Dynamics, and it is described in detail in the 2001 and 2002 Adult Population Surveys’ data doc-
umentation and in Reynolds et al. (2005). Appendix III reports the Flash Eurobarometer survey
questions used to generate the variables TEA , TEAOPP, TEANEC.
13One reason to consider the nascent and the early stage entrepreneurs together is that the size of
these two groups can be quite small, particularly in European countries.
14We construct our own indices, rather than using the ones provided to us by Loayza et al. (2004)
because regulatory variables for several countries included in our sample are not available in Loayza
et al. (2004).
11procedures that are ofﬁcially required to start and operate a new business, the time
and cost of completing such procedures, and a composite index measuring not only
how easy/difﬁcult it is to operate a business but also the degree of corruption in the
government and whether or not regulation is applied uniformly to all businesses.
Contract: The contract enforcement index measures the efﬁciency of the jus-
tice system in resolving commercial disputes. It is the average of the number of
procedures required to solve a dispute and of an index measuring the ability of the
government to operate without dramatic changes in policy or interruptions of its
services.
Labor: The labor index measures the difﬁculty for entrepreneurs of adjusting
the labor force. It is the average of indices measuring the difﬁculty in hiring and
ﬁring workers, the rigidity of labor contracts, and the percentage of the workforce
afﬁliated with labor unions.
The data we use are from a variety of sources: Doing Business Database (the
World Bank Group), Index of Economic Freedom (the Heritage Foundation), Inter-
national Country Risk Guide (the PRS Group), and Djankov et al. (2004). Appen-
dix I lists the exact source, time period, and deﬁnition of each regulatory variable
used in the empirical analysis.
Because our indices of regulation combine several different variables, we stan-






when lower values of the variable X indicate heavier regulation. Hence, each stan-
dardized regulatory variable is simply anindex ranging from 0 to 1, increasing with
the amount of regulation. For each area of regulation, we construct a synthetic in-
dicator of the tightness of regulation. Each synthetic indicator is the average of the
standardized indices measuring regulation of the relevant area. Use of these indices
allows us to compare our results to previous studies and to capture many different
aspects of regulation in the three areas we consider.15
Given that we have a different sample, we ﬁrst compute the correlation of the
indices we constructed with the ones of Loayza et al. (2004). For our larger sam-
ple, which includes all the countries surveyed in GEM, the correlation is equal to
0.98 for the entry regulatory index, 0.82 for the contract enforcement regulation
index, and 0.83 for the labor market regulation index. Thus, even though our sam-
ple of countries differs from that of Loayza et al. (2004), our indices are very
similar. Second, we examine the correlation across indices. While the Entry and
Contract indices measure different aspects of regulation, the two are highly posi-
tivelycorrelated. Thecorrelationofthesetwoindicesandthe Labor indexisrather
low, indicating that the regulation in labor markets often differs from the regulation
15For each index we construct, a higher value corresponds to tighter regulation.
12in other markets. When we further look at the correlation among the components
of each synthetic index, in all areas but the labor market we again ﬁnd a positive
correlation that ranges from a minimum of 38% to a maximum of 72%. However,
for the labor market index, we observe a very low correlation between indicators
of hiring and ﬁring costs and union density, and, in one case, the correlation is
negative. Thus, regulation in the labor markets can have different effects than reg-
u l a t i o ni no t h e rm a r k e t s .G i v e nt h e s eﬁndings, we consider these three indices of
regulation separately in our empirical work.
We begin the empirical analysis with some descriptive statistics on the rela-
tionship between entrepreneurship and countries’ regulatory environments. For
brevity, we present only descriptive statistics based on GEM data. Results ob-
tained using the Flash Eurobarometer data are consistent with those using GEM
data and they are available upon request. Figure 1 reports the rate of entrepreneur-
ship across countries in different income groups.16 As the ﬁgure illustrates, it is
critically important to be able to distinguish between types of entrepreneurs. Entre-
preneurship rates are highest among low-income countries and lowest among high-
income countries, but the composition of entrepreneurship differs dramatically
across countries. A very sizable proportion of entrepreneurship in low-income
countries is simply necessity entrepreneurship, while the lion’s share of entrepre-
neurship in high-income countriesis madeup ofopportunity entrepreneurs. In fact,
when we look at the ratio of opportunity entrepreneurship over necessity entrepre-
neurship, the ranking simply reverses: not only do the high-income countries have
the highest ratio and the low-income countries have the lowest ratio, but the ra-
tio in high-income countries is four times as high. Looking at regulation, we ﬁnd
that regulatory constraints, particularly entry and contract regulation, are highest in
low-income countries and lowest in high-income countries. This negative correla-
tion between regulation and income is hard to interpret; while regulation can affect
income, countries with different income status may also adopt different regula-
tory policies. In Figure 1 we also report the rate of entrepreneurship and regulation
across geographicregions and acrosslegal origins, twoclassiﬁcationsthatare more
exogenous to both entrepreneurship and regulatory constraints. This classiﬁcation
shows again that the ability to distinguish between opportunity and necessity en-
trepreneurship matters a great deal. Looking at the rate of entrepreneurship only,
we ﬁnd that Latin American countries display the highest rate of entrepreneurship
while OECD or European Union countries display a much lower level of entrepre-
neurship. However, this statistic hides a fundamental difference between the type
of entrepreneurs in these countries: While in OECD and EU countries, most of the
entrepreneurs are opportunity entrepreneurs, in Latin America a very large share of
16See Appendix I for the list of countries in each income group.
13entrepreneurs are necessity entrepreneurs. Again, the ranking of countries simply
reverses when we consider the ratio of opportunity over necessity entrepreneurs
rather than the rate of entrepreneurship. Regulation by geographic region very
closely mimics the pattern described by the ratio of entrepreneurial types in these
countries. Regulation, particularly contract regulation, is highest in Latin America
and lowest in EU and OECD countries. A similar pattern is obtained when we
look across countries with different legal origins. Looking at the rate of entrepre-
neurship only, we ﬁnd that Scandinavian countries have the lowest while English
and French legal origin countries have the highest rates of entrepreneurship. How-
ever, it is the Scandinavian countries that display the highest ratio of opportunity
over necessity entrepreneurship and these countries also have the lowest regula-
tory constraints, particularly with regard to entry and contract regulation. On the
other hand, both Socialist and French origin countries have the highest level of
(entry and contract) regulation and they have the lowest ratio of opportunity over
necessity entrepreneurship.
As Figure 2 and Table 1 show, opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs start
businesses that differ in several dimensions; thus, the effect on economic activ-
ity can vary widely.17 First, 40% of necessity entrepreneurs start activities in the
retail, hotel, and restaurant sector; only 27% of opportunity entrepreneurs target
this sector. The latter are, instead, more present in the business and consumer
services sectors, and in the ﬁnance, insurance, and real estate sectors. Second, a
larger fraction of opportunity entrepreneurs than of necessity entrepreneurs offers
products and services that are considered new by their customers and are not pro-
vided by many other businesses. This suggests that opportunity entrepreneurs are
more likely to contribute to product innovation than necessity entrepreneurs and to
increase competition in areas where fewer incumbents operate. Third, the vast ma-
jority of necessity entrepreneurs (68.2%) sell their products or services exclusively
to domestic customers; 50% or more of the customers live in a foreign country
for about 15% of opportunity entrepreneurs in our sample. Finally, opportunity
and necessity entrepreneurship signiﬁcantly differ in terms of job creation. Table 1
shows the average number of jobs created, or expected to be created inﬁve years, at
different points of the employment distribution. While in the bottom quartile of the
employment distribution the number of employees hired by opportunity and neces-
sity entrepreneurs is the same, employment creation is signiﬁcantly different in the
upper tail of the distribution. For example, in the 50th percentile of the employ-
ment distribution, opportunity entrepreneurs, on average, hired two employees and
expect to hire four employees in ﬁve years. Necessity entrepreneurs hired only one
17See Appendix II for the exact wording of the questions used to compute the variables shown in
F i g u r e2a n di nT a b l e1 .
14employee and expect to hire two employees in ﬁve years. This difference magni-
ﬁes for businesses in the top 1% of the distribution: for opportunity entrepreneurs,
current employment is at 150 workers and it is expected to grow, on average, to
500 workers; for necessity entrepreneurs, the same numbers are 50 and 150.
While these simple statistics provide some prima facie evidence that regulation
hinders entrepreneurship, it is in fact hard to draw inference from these aggregated
dataascountries’regulationcansimplyproxyforaggregatecharacteristics(growth
rates, degrees of openness, level of taxation, etc.) that also inﬂuence entrepreneur-
ship. We turn below to a more formal analysis of our model that explicitly exploits
the micro data and investigates the channels described in our theoretical model.
4 Econometric analysis
According to our model, heavier regulation has a direct as well as an indirect effect
on the likelihood of engaging in entrepreneurship via the interaction between coun-
tries’ regulation and individual characteristics. We estimate these effects by using
the following empirical speciﬁcation: for individual i, in country j,a tt i m et,t h e
outcome of interest is yijt,w h e r ey is one of the three measures of entrepreneurial
activity: TEA, TEAOPP, TEANEC. We estimate the following equation for
yijt:
yijt = α j + β1Xijt + β2XijtRjt + β3Rjt + γ t + εijt (11)
where α j is a vector of country dummies; X is a vector of variables measuring
individual characteristics such as age, gender, employment status, education, in-
come, the role of social networks, business skills, and fear of failure; R captures
countries’ regulatory and legal environment; and γ t is a vector of time dummies.
Since the dependent variable is binary, we use probit estimation and correct the
standard errors by clustering them at the country level.18
Our sample includes many different countries whose macroeconomic and insti-
tutional characteristics, as explained above, can be correlated both with the entre-
preneurship indices and with the regulatory variables. While we cannot separately
account for each country’s macroeconomic and institutional variables, we can con-
trol for countries’ speciﬁc characteristics by adding country ﬁxed effects to our
regressions.
18In the regressions usingthe GEMdata, we do not need tocorrect the standard errors as suggested
by Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton, Wang, and Ai (2004) because of the dummy variable nature of
our indicators and because, as explained below, the regulatory indices are not separately included in
the regressions.
15In ourbenchmark regressions that usethe micro datafromtheGEMAdult Pop-
ulation database, the regulatory variables are country and time invariant.19 Hence,
once we include α j among our regressors, we cannot estimate the coefﬁcient β3
and we can only measure the effect of regulation emphasized in our theoretical
model by examining the differential effect that personal characteristics have on the
decision to engage in entrepreneurial activity because of cross-country differences
in the regulatory and legal environments. Thus, the parameter of interest is β2.
Negative values of β2 in equation (11) indicate that heavier regulation reduces the
effect of personal characteristics on the likelihood of engaging in entrepreneurship
when β1 in equation (11) is positive and reinforces the effect of personal character-
istics when β1 is negative. In other words, β2 will indicate whether and how much
regulation acts as a detriment or an encouragement to entrepreneurship.
In section 4.2, when we consider the Flash Eurobarometer data, we can exploit
the time variation of the regulatory indices and estimate also the effect of regula-
tion directly (i.e., we can estimate the coefﬁcient β3) in addition to its effect via
individual characteristics.
4.1 Empirical ﬁndings: Benchmark speciﬁcations
In this section we report the results of our benchmark models that use the data
from GEM. As mentioned above, we use a vector of variables X measuring indi-
vidual characteristics in our empirical work. Some, such as age, gender, education,
working status, and income, have been used in other studies on entrepreneurship.
Other variables to explain entrepreneurship, such as self-assessed business skills,
attitudes toward risk, and social networks, are not present in many other surveys
but are available in GEM data. We can therefore account for a rich set of individual
characteristics in our empirical work.20 Appendix I provides a detailed description
of the variables we use and their deﬁnitions. We report hereafter the description
of some of the innovative variables we have used in our work. Self-assessed busi-
ness skills (Skills) are measured by a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual
answers that he or she has the knowledge, skill, and experience to start a new busi-
ness; the variable is equal to 0 otherwise. Fear of failure, a proxy for individual
attitudestowardrisk, ismeasuredbythedummy variable Fearfail, whichisequal
to 1 for individuals who answer that fear of failing prevents them from starting a
19Most of the variables used to construct the regulatory indicators are from the World Bank Doing
Business Database and refer to January 2003 as earlier data are not available. Since regulation is
pretty stable over time, we use these data to measure regulation throughout the period covered by the
GEM data (2001-2003).
20Other papers that have used these types of variables include de Melo, McKenzie, and Woodruff
(2008) and Djankov et al. (2008).
16new business; the variable is equal to 0 otherwise. Finally, we measure social net-
works with the dummy variable Knowent, which is equal to 1 if an individual
knows someone who has started a business in the past two years; the variable is
equal to 0 otherwise.21
These variables vary substantially across countries and, particularly, according
to countries’ income levels. For example, both social networks and fear of failure
are much lower in low-income countries than in high-income countries. More-
over, the proportion of individuals who are not working is substantially higher in
low-income countries than in high-income countries. Similarly, the fraction of in-
dividuals with a college degree is much smaller in low-income countries than in
other countries. In our data set, we also have information on the respondents’ in-
come. Given the importance of income for entrepreneurship, we report estimates
with and without income dummies. Because the information about income is not
always reported, we have to drop a sizable number of observations when we use
income data. However, estimates across samples will provide some evidence of the
robustness of our results.
In Table 2, we report the effects of individual characteristics and the interaction
between individual characteristics and Entryregulation on the three indices of en-
trepreneurial activity, TEA, TEAOPP, TEANEC.I nT a b l e s3a n d4 ,w er e p o r t
the estimates for the other two measures of regulation: Contract and Labor. We
ﬁrst highlight some results about demographic variables. Consistent with other
studies (Levesque and Minniti (2006), Hurst and Lusardi (2008)) we ﬁnd a hump-
shaped proﬁle for entrepreneurship in response to age changes; the probability of
starting a new business increases until age 33 and decreases thereafter. Women are
much less likely to become entrepreneurs, and this is the case for both opportu-
nity and necessity entrepreneurship (Blanchﬂower (2004), Verheul, van Stel, and
Thurik (2007)). One of the most noteworthy results of our estimates is the effect
of education on entrepreneurship. Education is found to have no effect on the to-
tal measure of entrepreneurship. However, education has an effect on the type of
entrepreneurship would-be entrepreneurs engage in. Speciﬁcally, those with a col-
lege degree are more likely to pursue opportunity entrepreneurship and less likely
to pursue necessity entrepreneurship. Those with a high school education are also
less likely to engage in necessity entrepreneurship. This is an important ﬁnding
and can explain, for example, why previous studies have found different results on
the effect of education on entrepreneurship; the effect on entrepreneurship depends
very much on the measure of entrepreneurship one considers. Most importantly,
21Although we areawarethatthesevariablesmay not betrulyexogenouswithrespecttothechoice
of starting a new business, they can be critical indicators of the impediments or the stimulators of
business creation and they can help explain the wide heterogeneity we see among business owners.
Given our focus on regulation, we will not account for the potential endogeneity of these variables.
17this ﬁnding highlights why developing countries, where the population have low
levels of educational attainment, display such high rates of entrepreneurship; how-
ever, many of these entrepreneurs are remedial/necessity entrepreneurs. Another
important result is that both types of entrepreneurship - opportunity and necessity -
require some skills. Those who report having business skills are more likely to start
a business. This again highlights one feature we think is not emphasized enough in
the empirical work on entrepreneurs, i.e., the importance of skills. As discussed in
detail in Koellinger, Minniti, and Schade (2007), self-perception of business skill
is a critical determinant of entrepreneurship. According to our model as well, it is
those who have more business skills who are more productive and therefore more
likely to become entrepreneurs. Fear of failure also affects entrepreneurship, but
the effect is concentrated on opportunity entrepreneurs only. This ﬁnding provides
additional evidence that necessity entrepreneurs are rather different than opportu-
nity entrepreneurs and that it is important to keep them distinct. Another impor-
tant determinant of entrepreneurship is social networks, i.e., whether entrepreneurs
know someone else who has started a business. Peer/network effects have been
shown to be important for entrepreneurship and, in our sample as well, they are
found to affect both opportunity and necessity entrepreneurs.22
As our model emphasizes, regulation can affect entrepreneurship via its effect
on demographic characteristics. Starting with Entry, regulation dampens the neg-
ative effect of being a female (Table 2). However, this effect is only signiﬁcant
with regards to necessity entrepreneurship. Thus, women in more regulated coun-
tries are more likely to start a business because they cannot ﬁnd better economic
work. To assess the economic magnitude of this effect, we compare the effect of
gender on entrepreneurship in low versus high regulation countries. In countries
w h e r ee n t r yr e g u l a t i o ni sa ti t sl o w e s tv a l u e( R = 0), women are 0.5 percentage
points LESS likely to start a new business because they cannot ﬁnd better work.
But in countries where entry regulation is at its maximum value (R = 1), women
will be 0.7 percentage points MORE likely to start a new business because they
cannot ﬁnd better work. Thus, regulation can pull women into business ownership,
but not in order to pursue a business opportunity. This may explain why women
are more likely to start smaller and less proﬁtable businesses, even in developed
countries (Coleman (2002)). Moreover, regulation accentuates the effect of not
working. Those who are unemployed and do not currently work are less likely to
start a business in countries where entry regulation is tighter.
Entry regulation also works through three other important determinants of en-
trepreneurship: social networks, business skills, and fear of failure. Entry regula-
22See Minniti (2005), Nanda and Sorensen (2008), Guiso and Schivardi (2007) and the references
therein.
18tion dampens the effect of social networks; in countries with tighter entry regula-
tion, knowing other entrepreneurs is shown to be less conducive to starting a new
business. The effect is sizable. In countries with the highest level of entry regula-
tion (R = 1), knowing other business owners increases the probability of starting
a new business by 1.8 percentage points. Conversely, in countries where entry reg-
ulation is at its lowest level of zero (R = 0), knowing someone who has started a
business in the recent past increases the probability of starting a new business by
5.3 percentage points. Thus, the effect is much increased with lower regulation.
Moreover, the effect of regulation reduces sharply for the type of entrepreneurship
we care about the most: opportunity entrepreneurship; the effect of social networks
decreases from 3.7 to 1.3 percentage points. Similarly, entry regulation dampens
the effect of business skills and again for opportunity entrepreneurship only: those
who report having business skills are less likely to employ these skills to pursue
a business opportunity. The effect is sizable. In countries in which regulation is
at its highest levels, self-assessed skills increase the probability of becoming en-
trepreneurs to pursue a business opportunity by only 4 percentage points. That
effect increases to 6.5 percentage points in countries with the lowest levels of entry
regulation. Finally, entry regulation accentuates the effect of fear of failure among
necessity entrepreneurs; when regulation ist i g h t e r ,p e o p l ew h oa r em o r es e n s i t i v e
to the risk of failure are less likely to start a new business. Overall, the effects
of entry regulation are detrimental to opportunity entrepreneurship. The ﬁndings
reported above all speak against entry regulation.
Contract regulation has similar and sometimes even worse effects (Table 3).
For example, the effect of contract regulation on women is stronger than the effect
of Entryregulation. The effect now becomes signiﬁcant for the total entrepreneur-
ship index TEA, even though it is only necessity entrepreneurship that is affected.
In otherwords, in countries with tighter contract regulation, women are more likely
to pursue necessity entrepreneurship, i.e., to start a business because they can’t ﬁnd
better work. In countries with the highest levels of contract regulation, women are
0.7 percentage points more likely to engage in necessity entrepreneurship as op-
posed to 0.4 percentage points more likely to do so in countries with the lowest
levels of contract regulation. Also, in countries with tighter contract regulation,
both students and the unemployed become less likely to pursue remedial entrepre-
neurial activity. As with entry regulation, contract regulation dampens the effect
of social networks: in countries with tighter contract regulation, knowing other
business owners is not as conducive to entrepreneurship, particularly opportunity
entrepreneurship. In countries with the highest levels of contract regulation, those
who know other business owners are only 1.9 percentage points more likely to en-
gage in opportunity entrepreneurship as compared to 3.1 percentage points more
likely in countries with the lowest levels of contract regulation. Importantly, con-
19tract regulation dampens the effect of business skills: in countries with the highest
levels of contract regulation, those who report having business skills are less likely
to engage in opportunity entrepreneurship. The likelihood of engaging in oppor-
tunity entrepreneurship is cut almost in half. In countries with the lowest levels
of regulation, those who have business skills are 6.3 percentage points more likely
to pursue a business opportunity; conversely in countries with the highest regula-
tion, that ﬁgure reduces to 3.4 percentage points. Moreover, contract regulation
exacerbates fear of failure and makes individuals less likely to pursue necessity
entrepreneurship. Thus, contract regulation, similar to entry regulation, is a sub-
stantial deterrent to entrepreneurship.
Labor regulation also displays detrimental effects on entrepreneurship (Table
4). First, tighter labor regulation discourages entrepreneurship among older work-
ers. Second, as in the other measures of regulation, labor regulation makes women
more likely to become necessity entrepreneurs. In countries with the lowest levels
of labor regulation, women are 0.4 percentage points less likely to start a business
because they cannot ﬁnd better work. In countries with the highest level of labor
regulation, women are 0.3 percentage points more likely to engage in necessity en-
trepreneurship. Tighter labor regulation discourages entrepreneurship among those
who do not work and among students, and for both necessity and opportunity en-
trepreneurship. Labor regulationsdampen theeffectsof socialnetwork on opportu-
nity entrepreneurship. In countries with the lowest levels of labor regulation, those
who know other business owners are 3.7 percentage points more likely to start a
new business to pursue a business opportunity. In countries with the highest labor
regulation, those who know other business owners are only 1.4 percentage points
more likely to engage in opportunity entrepreneurship. Finally, labor regulation
accentuates fear of failure not only for necessity but also for opportunity entrepre-
neurship. Thus, even according to this third measure, which is rather different than
the other two indices of regulation, regulation works against entrepreneurship.
These estimates conﬁrm the ﬁndings of other papers. For example Van Stel,
Storey, and Thurik (2007) use GEM data to examine the effect of business regu-
lation on entrepreneurship. They use a different set of countries, a different time
period, and different measures of regulation. Irrespective of these differences, their
proxies of regulation, and speciﬁcally minimum capital requirements and labor
market rigidity, are also found to have a negative effect on entrepreneurship. Aidis,
Estrin, and Mickiewicz (2007) use GEM data and ﬁnd that property rights are im-
portant for new businesses.23 Since their measure of property rights encompasses
some regulatory constraints - such as freedom from government inﬂuence over the
23See also Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz (2007) on the effect of institutions and networks in
Russia.
20judicial system - and delays in receiving judicial decisions and/or enforcement that
we used in the construction of our indices, they are not inconsistent with our re-
sults. Our estimates are also consistent with the work of Klapper, Laeven, and
Rajan (2006) that shows that entry regulation represents an important barrier to
entrepreneurship. Since they use a different deﬁnition of entrepreneurship, our re-
sults seem pretty robust. Ciccone and Papaioannou (2006) also ﬁnd slower growth
in expanding industries in countries where it takes longer to comply with pro-
cedures required to open a new ﬁrm. Rather than looking at entrepreneurship,
Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti, and Schiantarelli (2005) look at investment and ﬁnd
that product market regulation is negatively related to investment, providing further
evidence of the strength of our results.
Our results are robust to a variety of additional speciﬁcation changes. First,
when we control for dummy variables that capture the income level of the respon-
dent, we ﬁnd that the effects of regulation are very similar and even strengthen
(Table 5).24 As the estimates for the income dummies make clear, necessity en-
trepreneurship is much more prevalent among individuals in the lower tail of the
income distribution and less prevalent among individuals in the upper tail of the
income distribution, and the extent of market regulation does not affect this result.
On the contrary, the effect of income on the probability that an individual will start
a business to pursue an opportunity depends on the regulatory environment. In
countries that regulate entry and the labor market more heavily, would-be entre-
preneurs are more likely to pursue a business opportunity if their incomes are in
the upper tail of the distribution. Accounting for income does not change the esti-
mates of the other determinants of entrepreneurship, nor the detrimental effect of
regulation on entrepreneurship; the negative effects of regulation continue to hold
even after accounting for income.
Second, we have estimated the model for 2001 and 2002 only (see Ardagna and
Lusardi (2008a)). Results are very similar, but the inclusion of one additional year
of data makes the results stronger. We have also estimated the model separately for
each year.25 Results do not change substantially.
Third, we interact the components of each synthetic index of regulation with
the vector of individual characteristics to investigate whether a particular aspect of
24The income distribution of each country is divided into three groups: low, middle and high
income (each including 33% of the population). Given his income, each respondent is then classiﬁed
as belonging to a speciﬁc income group. The income dummies Lowestinc and Upperincincluded
in Table 4 are equal to 1 if an individual’s income is in the lowest or upper third, respectively, of the
income percentile of his country’s income distribution, and equal to 0 otherwise.
25Data for Portugal are not available in 2002. Data for Switzerland, Chile, Thailand, China, Tai-
wan, Hong Kong, Croatia, and Slovenia are not available in 2001. Data for Greece, Uganda, and
Venezuela are available only for 2003.
21regulation is driving the results reported in Tables 2-5. We ﬁnd that the compo-
nents of the indices generally have similar effects on entrepreneurship even though
some components have a larger and more signiﬁcant effect through some personal
characteristics’ variables than through others.26
Finally, we examine whether our results hinge on data for a particular country.
We exclude one country at a time and reestimate the speciﬁcation used in Tables
2-5. Results are qualitatively the same, even when excluding Russia, Poland, and
Slovenia, whose data seem to be of poorer quality.27
4.2 Entrepreneurship and regulation: Evidence from the Flash Euro-
barometer
In this section, we estimate the regressions in Tables 2-4 using data from the Flash
Eurobarometer. The reason for this additional empirical analysis is twofold. First,
the estimates act as a robustness check on the quality of GEM data and the results
discussed so far. Second, and more importantly, using the Flash Eurobarometer
data, we can exploit the time variation of the regulatory indices28 and we are able
to investigate not only the indirect effect that regulation has on entrepreneurship
via its impact on the return of individual characteristics but also its direct effect.
Hence, we can estimate the coefﬁcient β3 in equation (11) above, assess the total
effect of regulation on entrepreneurship, and provide a more thorough empirical
test of our model.
Table 6 shows the results. First, the estimates of the effect of individual charac-
teristics on the likelihood of starting a new business are similar to those presented
in Tables 2-4. For example, we ﬁnd a hump-shaped proﬁle for entrepreneurship in
response to age changes. Women are much less likely to become entrepreneurs and
this is the case for both opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship. Fear of going
bankrupt negatively affects entrepreneurship and, as in the regressions in Tables
2-4, the effect is concentrated mostly on opportunity entrepreneurs. Finally, an
individual’s social networks, measured in Table 6 with a dummy variable equal to
1 if at least one of the respondent’s parents is self-employed, are a very important
determinant of entrepreneurship. Once again, it is particularly so for opportunity
entrepreneurs. Second, we ﬁnd no robust evidence of a direct effect of regulation
on entrepreneurship. The coefﬁcients of the regulatory indicators are not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant except in one case. In column (6) the coefﬁcient of the contract
26For brevity, estimates are not reported but are available upon request.
27Estimates are not reported but are available from the authors.
28We use the 2003 and the 2006 Doing Business Database and match the regulatory indicators for
2003 with the 2004 Flash Eurobarometer data and the regulatory indicators for 2006 with the 2007
Flash Eurobarometer data.
22regulation variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level, imply-
ing that in countries with tighter contract regulation, individuals are more likely to
pursue necessity entrepreneurship. Third, regulation affects entrepreneurship via
its effect on some individual characteristics. As before, regulation dampens the
negative effect of being a female and this effect is only signiﬁcant for necessity
entrepreneurship. Hence, women in more regulated countries are more likely to
start a business because they cannot ﬁnd better economic work. Also, regulation
dampens the effect of social networks: in countries with tighter entry, contract, and
labor market regulation, having at least one self-employed parent has a positive
but lower effect on the likelihood of starting a new business than it does in less
regulated countries.
Finally, the effects of education on entrepreneurship are weaker, but overall
consistent with the results shown so far.29 In fact, the coefﬁcients of the vari-
ables HighSchool and College are not always statistically signiﬁcant. However,
the interaction terms of the education dummies and the regulatory indicators are
signiﬁcant in many speciﬁcations. Speciﬁcally, the interaction terms of the edu-
cation dummies and the indicator of entry regulation are signiﬁcant and their sign
and magnitude imply that those with a college degree are more likely to pursue
opportunity entrepreneurship and less likely to pursue necessity entrepreneurship.
Those with a high school education are also more likely to engage in opportunity
entrepreneurship. These effects are stronger in more regulated countries. Hence,
the probability that an individual with at least a high school degree will start a new
businessbecauseofanopportunity(necessity)increases(decreases)withentryreg-
ulation, signaling that education is extremely important to overcoming the barriers
introduced by entry regulation. Similarly, individuals with at least a high school or
college degree are less likely to engage in necessity entrepreneurship, more so in
countries with more pervasive regulation of labor markets.
4.3 Instrumental variables estimation
Even though regulation often results from laws enacted in the distant past, one
may worry that it is the level of entrepreneurship that affects regulation in a coun-
try. In other words, while our theoretical model does not discuss this possibility,
in fact the causality between entrepreneurship and regulation may go the oppo-
site way. Moreover, it could be that unobservables that drive entrepreneurship in
a country (e.g., an educational system that encourages individual responsibility or
29The dummy variables that measure whether an individual has a high school and/or a college
degree are proxied with some error. In fact, the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys ask each respondent
the age at which he/she completed full-time education but not the degree obtained. Appendix IV
describes how we computed the dummy variables included in the regression.
23an extensive welfare system that insulates against unemployment and health risks)
also drive the regulatory system in that country. Thus, the relationship between en-
trepreneurship and regulation may simply be the result of these omitted variables.
This problem may be less relevant in our empirical work since we also look at the
interaction of regulation with individual characteristics rather than simply looking
at the effect of regulation on entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, we tackle these con-
siderations by resorting to a different estimation strategy: instrumental variables
(IV) estimation.
We use countries’ legal origins as instruments. Several papers have shown that
current regulatory environments correlate with countries’ legal traditions.30 For
example, as illustrated in Figure 1, countries of English legal origin are among
those with low levels of regulation, while countries of French and Socialist legal
origin are more heavily regulated. Because countries’ legal origins are the result
of conquest and colonization that occurred centuries ago, legal origin is unlikely to
be correlated with omitted variables that inﬂuence individuals’ decisions to begin
a new entrepreneurial activity in the twenty-ﬁrst century.
As in Figure 1, we group countries with English (common law), French (civil
law), Socialist, German, and Scandinavian legal origins. We estimate equation (11)
instrumenting the variable R with the indicator variables that measure countries’
legal origins. Results are reported in Table 7. Note that coefﬁcient estimates are
included in Table 7, while marginal effects are reported in all the other tables of
the paper; hence, the numbers in the tables are not directly comparable. The esti-
mates continue to conﬁrm the results reported in Tables 2-5. Regulation acts as a
deterrent to entrepreneurship by curbing the effects of several important determi-
nants of entrepreneurship. For example, entry regulation curbs the effect of having
a college degree, of social networks, and of having business skills, and accentuates
the effect of fear of failure. Contract regulation also curbs the effects of college
education, social networks, and business skills, primarily for opportunity entrepre-
neurs. Labor regulation again curbs the effects of social networks and accentuates
the effects of fear of failure. Note that the p-value of a Wald test on the exogeneity
of the regressors does not reject exogeneity. Thus, the estimates reported in Tables
2-4 do not seem to be biased due to a potential endogeneity problem.
We also check whether the estimates obtained using the Flash Eurobarome-
ter data are robust to instrumenting regulation with countries’ legal origins. Even
though the effect of regulation via its effect on the return of some personal charac-
teristics is somewhat smaller, the IV results (not shown but available upon request)
are in general consistent with the ones shown in Table 6.31
30See La Porta et al. (1998, 2000).
31Notethatwhenweinstrumentregulationwithcountries’legalorigins, wearenotabletoestimate
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The estimates reported above illustrate that regulation is a major deterrent to en-
trepreneurship. Not only does tighter regulation dampen the effects of important
predictors of entrepreneurship, such as social networks and business skills, but it
also curbs opportunity entrepreneurship, which is the type of entrepreneurship that
matters the most in terms of employment and growth. While several authors have
proposed policies to encourage entrepreneurship that focus mostly on relaxing liq-
uidity constraints, in this paper we highlight another way in which countries can
foster entrepreneurship: relax regulation. According to our estimates, adopting the
policies of low-regulation countries can substantially spur the birth of new busi-
nesses. Easing of regulation will allow individuals who have business skills to try
out new ventures and will exploit the synergies offered by interactions with other
entrepreneurs. Moreover, entrepreneurs will be pulled into the type of entrepre-
neurship that can be more beneﬁcial for both the macro economy and individual
well-being.
As our estimation method clearly highlights, the effects of regulation tend to
concentrate on speciﬁc groups. For example, in more heavily regulated countries,
women, who are already less likely to become entrepreneurs, are more likely to
be pulled into necessity/remedial entrepreneurship. This suggests that policies to
foster entrepreneurship among women could be strenghtened simply by a decrease
in regulatory constraints. Similarly, those who do not currently work are harmed
by tighter regulation. Since these are already vulnerable groups, regulation can end
up having truly harmful effects.
Our estimates also point to some alternative ways in which entrepreneurship
can be supported. First, according to the estimates reported in Tables 2-6, policies
that support and foster education also foster entrepreneurship. Increasing educa-
tion attainment can achieve three important objectives: fostering entrepreneurship,
encouraging would-be entrepreneurs into pursuing business opportunity, and dis-
couraging necessity entrepreneurship. Very few policies can hit multiple targets in
such a way. Related to education, our estimates also indicate that those who have
business skills are more likely to enter entrepreneurship. Thus, teaching or fos-
tering such skills in schools or in training programs may be another way to foster
entrepreneurship.32 Peers and social networks are also important for entrepreneur-
the direct effect of regulation even with the Flash Eurobarometer data. Our instruments are time
invariant, and, hence, we cannot separately estimate the coefﬁcients of the country dummies and the
regulatory indicators.
32The paper by Klinger and Schundeln (2007) studies a business training program that an NGO
held in Central America between 2002 and 2005 and shows that entrepreneurial activity can be
fostered by training. In fact, receiving business training increases the likelihood of starting a new
25ship. Therefore, encouraging or creating business clusters could also jump-start
entrepreneurship.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have used two micro data sets measuring entrepreneurship across
countries to examine the effects of regulation. One major advantage of using these
data sets is the possibility of distinguishing between two distinct types of entre-
preneurs: those who intend to pursue a business opportunity and those who could
not ﬁnd better economic work. Because entrepreneurship usually mixes different
activities, not all of which should be promoted, it is critically important to be able
to differentiate between entrepreneurial types.
Irrespective of the measure of regulation we use, we always ﬁnd that regulation
is a detriment to entrepreneurial activity. In more heavily regulated countries, those
who have business skills, know other entrepreneurs, have less fear of failure, and
do not work are less likely to engage in entrepreneurship. Moreover, in countries
with higher regulation, vulnerable groups, such as women and those who do not
work, are more likely to be pulled into necessity entrepreneurship.
This isoneofthefewstudiesthat performsamicroanalysisofthedeterminants
of entrepreneurship and the effects of regulation from two data sets on a large cross
section of countries. We plan to expand this work further and examine in more
detail the two tails of entrepreneurship.
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31Appendix I: Variables used in the empirical analysis
Entrepreneurship indices. Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
• TEA= 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and man-
agers of a young ﬁrm; 0 otherwise.
• TEAOPP= 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and
managers of a young ﬁrm to take advantage of a business opportunity; 0
otherwise.
• TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and
managers of a young ﬁrm because they could ﬁnd no better economic work,
0 otherwise.
Individuals’ characteristics. Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
• AGE = age of the individual at the time of the interview.
• MALE= 1 if male; 0 otherwise.
• WORKING= 1 if individual works at the time of the interview; 0 other-
wise.
• STUDENTS = 1 if individual is a student at the time of the interview; 0
otherwise.
• RETIREDDISABLED= 1 if individual is retired or disabled at the time
of the interview; 0 otherwise.
• NOTWORKING = 1 if individual does not work (and he/she is not a
student nor a retired or disabled individual) at the time of the interview; 0
otherwise.
• HIGHSCHOOL= 1 if individual has a high school degree; 0 otherwise.
• COLLEGE= 1 if individual has at least a college degree; 0 otherwise.
• KNOWENT = 1 if the person knows someone who has started a business
in the recent past; 0 otherwise.
• SKILLS = 1 if the person thinks he or she has the knowledge, skills, and
experience to start a new business; 0 otherwise.
32• FEARFAIL= 1 if the person’s fear of failing can prevent him or her from
starting a new business; 0 otherwise.
• LOWESTINC = 1 if individual’s income is in the lowest 33rd income
percentile of his country’s income distribution; 0 otherwise.
• UPPERINC= 1 if individual’s income is in the upper 33rd income per-
centile of his country’s income distribution; 0 otherwise.
Regulatory Indices. Various sources
• ENTRY measures the barriers and costs entrepreneurs face when they de-
cide to create a new business; ENTRY = (procedures + time + cost + regu-
lation )/4.
• PROCEDURES = number of procedures that are ofﬁcially required to
start and operate a new business. Source: Doing Business Database (The
World Bank Group), 2003.
• TIME= time in calendar days needed to complete procedures that are ofﬁ-
cially required to start and operate a new business. Source: Doing Business
Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
• COST = cost (measured as a percentage of the country’s income per capita)
neededtocompleteproceduresthatareofﬁciallyrequired tostartandoperate
a new business. Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group),
2003.
• REGULATION(IEF)=compositeindexmeasuringnotonlyhoweasy/difﬁcult
it is to operate a business but also examining the degree of corruption in the
government and whether or not regulation is applied uniformly to all busi-
nesses. Source: Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Foundation),
variable name in IEF database: regulation, average 1995-2000.
• CONTRACT measures the efﬁciency of the justice system in resolving
commercial disputes; CONTRACT = (procedures + quality of bureau-
cracy)/2.
• PROCEDURES=numberofproceduresrequiredtosolveadispute. Source:
Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
• QUALITY OF BUREAUCRACY = index measuring the ability of the
government to operate without dramatic changes in policy or interruptions
of its services. Source: International Country Risk Guide (The PRS Group);
variable name in ICRG database: bureaucracy, average 1984-2000.
33• LABOR measures the difﬁculty for entrepreneurs of adjusting the labor
force. LABOR = (hiring index + ﬁring index + ﬁring costs + rigidity of
labor contracts + union density)/5.
• HIRINGINDEX =indexmeasuringtheavailabilityoftermcontractsfor
temporary/permanent task, the maximum cumulative duration of term con-
tracts, and the ratio of the minimum wage for a trainee or ﬁrst-time employee
to the average value added per worker. Source: Doing Business Database
(The World Bank Group), 2003.
• FIRING INDEX = index measuring whether redundancy is disallowed
as a basis to ﬁre a worker; the need for the employer to notify a third party
and/or to get approval from a third party when ﬁring one redundant worker
and/or a group of more than 20 redundant workers; whether the law requires
the employer to consider retraining or reassignment before ﬁring a redundant
worker; whether priority rules apply for redundancies and reemployment.
Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
• FIRINGCOST = index measuring the cost in weekly wages of advance
notice requirements, severance payments and penalties due when terminat-
ing a redundant worker. Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank
Group), 2003.
• RIGIDITY LABOR CONTRACTS = index measuring whether night
and/or weekend work is unrestricted, whether the workweek can consist of
5.5 days and/or can be extended to 50 hours or more (including overtime) for
2 months a year, whether paid annual vacation is 21 working days or fewer.
Source: Doing Business Database (The World Bank Group), 2003.
• UNION DENSITY = percentage of total workforce afﬁliated with labor
unions in 1997. Source: Djankov et al. (2004).
Countries’ groups
• LOW INCOME includes India. Source: World Bank’s classiﬁcation, see
www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm.
• MIDDLE LOWINC includes Brazil, China, Thailand. Source: World
Bank’sclassiﬁcation, seewww.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm.
• UPPER MIDDLE INC includes Argentina, Chile, Croatia, Hungary,
Mexico, Poland, Russia, South Africa. Source: World Bank’s classiﬁcation,
see www.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm.
34• HIGH INCOME includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, South
Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, UnitedKingdom, UnitedStates. Source:
WorldBank’sclassiﬁcation, seewww.worldbank.org/data/countryclass/classgroups.htm.
• OECD includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
• EU includes Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
• ECAincludes Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovenia.
• EAP includes China, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thai-
land.
• LATINAMERICAincludes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico.
Legal Origin
• ENGLISH includes Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Israel,
New Zealand, South Africa, Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom, United
States. Source: Djankov et al. (2003).
• SOCIALIST includes China, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovenia.
Source: Djankov et al. (2003).
• FRENCH includes Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France, Italy, Mex-
ico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. Source: Djankov et al. (2003).
• GERMAN includes Germany, Japan, Switzerland, South Korea, Taiwan.
Source: Djankov et al. (2003).
• SCANDINAVIAN includesDenmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden. Source:
Djankov et al. (2003).
35Appendix II: GEM survey questions
The following are the questions that the GEM coordination team uses to gen-
erate the variables TEA, TEAOPP, TEANEC. Questions are from the 2002
data documentation manual. Questions asked in 2001 were exactly the same, even
thoughthenumberingofthequestionschanged. Themethodologyfollowedtocon-
struct the indices is based on procedures previously used in the U.S. Panel Study of
Entrepreneurial Dynamics, and it is described in detail in the 2001 and 2002 Adult
Population Survey data documentation and in Reynolds et al. (2005).
• 1. Which of the following would apply to you? (Possible answers: Yes, No,
Don’t Know, Refused)
• 1a. You are, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business,
including any self-employment or selling any goods or services to others.
• 1b. You are, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business or
a new venture for your employer, an effort that is part of your normal work.
• 1c. You are, alone or with others, currently the owner of a company you help
manage, self-employed, or selling any goods or services to others.
• If "Yes", Or “Don’t Know” To Qu. 1a or Qu. 1b, Ask Qu 2a. If “Yes”, Or
“Don’t Know” To Qu. 1c, Ask Qu. 3a.
• 2a. Over the past twelve months, have you done anything to help start a new
business, such as looking for equipment or a location, organizing a start-up
team, working on a business plan, beginning to save money, or any other
activity that would help launch a business?
• 2b. Will you personally own all, part, or none of this business?
• 2d. Has the new business paid any salaries, wages, or payments in kind,
including your own, for more than three months?
• 2d1. What was the ﬁrst year the owners received wages, proﬁts, or payments
in kind?
• 2g. Are you involved in this start-up to take advantage of a business oppor-
tunity or because you have no better choices for work?
• 3a. Do you personally own all, part, or none of this business?
36• 3c. What was the ﬁrst year the owners received wages, proﬁts, or payments
in kind? Payments in kind refers to goods or services provided as payments
for work rather than cash.33
• 3g. Are you involved in this ﬁrm to take advantage of a business opportunity
or because you have no better choices for work?
The following are the survey questions used to deﬁne the variables Knowent,
Skills,a n dFearfail, respectively. Questions are from the 2002 data documen-
tation manual. Questions asked in 2001 were exactly the same even though the
numbering of the questions changed.
• 1. Which of the following would apply to you? (Possible answers: Yes, No,
Don’t Know, Refused)
• 1g. You know someone personally who started a business in the past two
years.
• 1i. You have the knowledge, skill, and experience required to start a new
business.
• 1j. Fear of failure would prevent you from starting a business.
33From this question, researchers can identify owners who have received wages, proﬁts, or pay-
ments in kind for no more than 42 months.
37Appendix III: Flash Eurobarometer Surveys
The survey questions of the Flash Eurobarometer Surveys used to generate the
variables TEA , TEAOPP, TEANECi nT a b l e7a r et h ef o l l o w i n g :
• 1) Have you started a business recently or are you taking steps to start a new
one? (Possible answers: a) It never came to your mind. b) No, but you are
thinking about it. c) No, you thought of it and you had already taken steps
to start a business but gave up. d) Yes, you are currently taking steps to start
a new business. e) Yes, you have started or taken over a business in the last
three years which is still active today. f) Yes, you started or took over a busi-
ness more than three years ago and it is still active. g) No, you once started
a business, but currently you are no longer an entrepreneur (business has
failed, business was sold, or the interviewee has retired). h) Don’t Know).
• 2)All inall, wouldyousay youstarted, orarestarting, yourbusinessbecause
you saw an opportunity or you started it out of necessity? (Possible answers:
a) You started it because you came across an opportunity. b) You started it
because it was a necessity. c) Both. d) Don’t Know).
The variables TEA , TEAOPP, TEANECin Table 7 are deﬁned as follows:
• TEA= 1 if individuals replied “Yes, you are currently taking steps to start a
new business” or “Yes, you have started or taken over a business in the last
three years which is still active today” to question 1 above; 0 otherwise.
• TEAOPP = 1 if individuals replied “Yes, you are currently taking steps
to start a new business” or “Yes, you have started or taken over a business
in the last three years which is still active today” to question 1 above and
individuals replied “You started it because you came across an opportunity”
to question 2 above; 0 otherwise.
• TEANEC = 1 if individuals replied “Yes, you are currently taking steps
to start a new business” or “Yes, you have started or taken over a business
in the last three years which is still active today” to question 1 above and
individuals replied “You started it because it was a necessity” to question 2
above; 0 otherwise.
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Table 1: Opportunity entrepreneurs, necessity entrepreneurs and job creation 
        
  EMPLOYMENT AT TIME OF SURVEY  EXPECTED EMPLOYMENT IN 5 YEARS 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  TEAOPP TEANEC TEAOPP TEANEC 
        
10
TH PERCENTILE 0  0  0  0 
        
25
TH PERCENTILE 0  0  2  1 
        
50
TH PERCENTILE 2  1  4  2 
        
75
TH PERCENTILE 5  3 10 6 
        
90
TH PERCENTILE 12  6  30 15 
        
95
TH PERCENTILE 24 10 60 25 
        
99
TH PERCENTILE 150 50 500  150 
        
99.5
TH PERCENTILE  500  133 1100 400 
Notes: Average number of jobs created, or expected to be created in five years, at different points of the employment 
distribution. TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm to take 
advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and 
managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise. See Appendix I and Appendix II 
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Table 2: Entrepreneurship and regulation of entry 
  R = ENTRY  R = ENTRY  R = ENTRY 
 TEA  TEAOPP  TEANEC 
  (1) (2) (3) 
AGE 0.001977***  0.001327***  0.000500*** 
 (3.74)  (3.46)  (3.27) 
AGE SQUARE  -0.000030*** -0.000021*** -0.000006*** 
  (-4.81) (-4.51) (-3.14) 
FEMALE  -0.018290*** -0.009064*** -0.005325*** 
  (-4.82) (-3.49) (-5.19) 
NOT WORKING -0.001028  -0.005900  0.005483* 
 (-0.16)  (-1.38)  (1.96) 
STUDENTS -0.016442**  -0.013323***  0.001313 
 (-2.34)  (-2.88)  (0.30) 
RET. DIS. -0.027894***  -0.019092***  -0.003620 
  (-3.53) (-3.23) (-1.24) 
HIGHSCHOOL -0.002280  0.001855  -0.003511** 
 (-0.53)  (0.57)  (-2.28) 
COLLEGE 0.004466  0.007290***  -0.004661*** 
 (1.04)  (2.79)  (-2.91) 
KNOWENT 0.052717***  0.037040***  0.007082*** 
 (15.07)  (12.73)  (6.19) 
SKILLS 0.091225***  0.064837***  0.014132*** 
 (18.92)  (18.68)  (7.98) 
FEARFAIL -0.017024***  -0.013636***  0.000720 
 (-4.72)  (-4.88)  (0.79) 
R*AGE  -0.000707 -0.000737 -0.000148 
  (-1.13) (-1.45) (-0.77) 
R*FEMALE 0.020791  -0.001786  0.012010*** 
  (1.33) (-0.16) (3.32) 
R*NOT WORK. -0.072694***  -0.036143**  -0.022172*** 
  (-4.33) (-2.39) (-4.27) 
R*STUDENTS  -0.082681*** -0.038231 -0.033333*** 
  (-2.78) (-1.58) (-2.99) 
R* RET. DIS 0.011276  0.017505  -0.005000 
 (0.44)  (0.85)  (-0.56) 
R*HIGHSCHOOL 0.010708  0.009930  0.004646 
 (0.76)  (1.13)  (1.04) 
R*COLLEGE -0.007131  0.004735  -0.000475 
 (-0.46)  (0.60)  (-0.07) 
R*KNOWENT -0.035033***  -0.024203***  -0.003522 
  (-3.00) (-2.58) (-1.07) 
R*SKILLS -0.039690***  -0.024658**  -0.004724 
  (-3.07) (-2.48) (-1.00) 
R*FEARFAIL -0.008653  -0.007651  -0.004621* 
  (-0.76) (-0.81) (-1.77) 
OBSERVATIONS  166857 166181 164839 
Notes: Probit regressions including country fixed effects and time dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. Marginal effects (not coefficients) and t-stat. are shown in the tables. ***, **, * coefficients statistically significant at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a 
young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young 
firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are 
owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise; ENTRY measures the 
barriers and costs entrepreneurs face when they decide to create a new business; ENTRY = (procedures + time + cost + 
regulation (IEF))/4. See Appendix I and Appendix II for the exact definition of the variables. 
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Table 3: Entrepreneurship and contract enforcement regulation 
  R = CONTRACT  R = CONTRACT  R = CONTRACT 
 TEA  TEAOPP  TEANEC 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
AGE 0.001849***  0.001232***  0.000495*** 
 (3.39)  (3.15)  (3.21) 
AGE SQUARE -0.000031***  -0.000021***  -0.000006*** 
 (-4.70)  (-4.40)  (-3.27) 
FEMALE -0.018194***  -0.010504***  -0.004568*** 
 (-8.43)  (-7.27)  (-6.18) 
NOT WORKING -0.011189**  -0.011199***  0.002494 
 (-2.12)  (-3.53)  (1.08) 
STUDENTS -0.025122***  -0.018459***  -0.002661 
 (-5.19)  (-6.20)  (-0.98) 
RET. DIS. -0.026081***  -0.018037***  -0.003036 
 (-3.99)  (-4.03)  (-1.16) 
HIGHSCHOOL 0.001409  0.003732  -0.002666* 
 (0.44)  (1.49)  (-1.91) 
COLLEGE 0.006532**  0.008436***  -0.004037*** 
 (2.13)  (4.48)  (-3.19) 
KNOWENT 0.046293***  0.031179***  0.007739*** 
 (17.51)  (15.50)  (6.85) 
SKILLS 0.085762***  0.062881***  0.012700*** 
 (20.68)  (22.41)  (9.43) 
FEARFAIL -0.018263***  -0.014909***  0.000885 
 (-5.87)  (-6.39)  (1.24) 
R*AGE -0.000268  -0.000405  -0.000107 
 (-0.60)  (-1.48)  (-0.62) 
R*FEMALE 0.028359***  0.004971  0.011876*** 
 (3.00)  (0.73)  (4.06) 
R*NOT WORK. -0.047537***  -0.019528  -0.017680*** 
 (-2.90)  (-1.52)  (-3.57) 
R*STUDENTS -0.041016**  -0.005438  -0.022236*** 
 (-2.03)  (-0.39)  (-2.92) 
R* RET. DIS -0.002370  0.011207  -0.009164 
 (-0.10)  (0.80)  (-0.94) 
R*HIGHSCHOOL 0.000347  0.005720  0.002909 
 (0.02)  (0.57)  (0.65) 
R*COLLEGE -0.016527  0.002093  -0.003031 
 (-1.08)  (0.28)  (-0.51) 
R*KNOWENT -0.025627***  -0.012403*  -0.006225* 
 (-2.98)  (-1.85)  (-1.85) 
R*SKILLS -0.036565***  -0.028802***  -0.001891 
 (-2.68)  (-3.16)  (-0.45) 
R*FEARFAIL -0.004806  -0.003593  -0.006098*** 
 (-0.44)  (-0.42)  (-2.58) 
OBSERVATIONS 166857  166181  164839 
Notes: Probit regressions including country fixed effects and time dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. Marginal effects (not coefficients) and t-stat. are shown in the tables. ***, **, * coefficients statistically significant at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a 
young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young 
firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are 
owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise; CONTRACT 
measures the efficiency of the justice system in resolving commercial disputes; CONTRACT = (procedures + quality of 
bureaucracy)/2. See Appendix I and Appendix II for the exact definition of the variables. 
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Table 4: Entrepreneurship and regulation of labor 
  R = LABOR  R = LABOR  R = LABOR 
 TEA  TEAOPP  TEANEC 
  (1) (2) (3) 
AGE 0.002175***  0.001436***  0.000490*** 
 (4.11)  (3.92)  (2.61) 
AGE SQUARE  -0.000030*** -0.000021*** -0.000006*** 
  (-4.89) (-4.62) (-2.73) 
FEMALE -0.012092***  -0.006856***  -0.003508** 
  (-3.47) (-3.41) (-2.53) 
NOT WORKING -0.004398  -0.005486**  0.002226 
 (-0.83)  (-2.01)  (0.64) 
STUDENTS -0.016227*  -0.012825**  0.001009 
 (-1.76)  (-2.31)  (0.24) 
RET. DIS. -0.027962***  -0.018431***  -0.003859 
  (-2.87) (-2.81) (-1.05) 
HIGHSCHOOL -0.001931  0.002978  -0.003349* 
 (-0.52)  (0.87)  (-1.93) 
COLLEGE 0.002503  0.007863***  -0.004839*** 
 (0.73)  (3.65)  (-4.28) 
KNOWENT 0.052671***  0.037412***  0.006388*** 
 (13.72)  (11.94)  (5.02) 
SKILLS 0.078875***  0.056148***  0.011736*** 
 (13.75)  (18.25)  (5.38) 
FEARFAIL -0.010343***  -0.009560***  0.002065*** 
 (-3.90)  (-4.65)  (2.97) 
R*AGE -0.001258*  -0.001061**  -0.000170 
  (-1.77) (-1.99) (-1.30) 
R*FEMALE -0.000962  -0.008777  0.006393** 
 (-0.09)  (-1.23)  (2.11) 
R*NOT WORK. -0.057495***  -0.036113***  -0.013965* 
  (-3.39) (-3.39) (-1.74) 
R*STUDENTS -0.079637**  -0.039367*  -0.031052*** 
  (-2.42) (-1.73) (-2.73) 
R* RET. DIS 0.010893  0.011612  -0.004534 
 (0.30)  (0.47)  (-0.38) 
R*HIGHSCHOOL 0.006220  0.004254  0.003611 
 (0.78)  (0.53)  (0.83) 
R*COLLEGE -0.001468  0.001462  0.000209 
 (-0.18)  (0.25)  (0.07) 
R*KNOWENT -0.032427***  -0.023409***  -0.001709 
  (-2.66) (-2.75) (-0.44) 
R*SKILLS -0.008286  -0.004175  0.000726 
 (-0.60)  (-0.49)  (0.16) 
R*FEARFAIL  -0.032133*** -0.022408*** -0.008660*** 
  (-3.63) (-3.21) (-3.27) 
OBSERVATIONS  163507 162851 161509 
Notes: Probit regressions including country fixed effects and time dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. Marginal effects (not coefficients) and t-stat. are shown in the tables. ***, **, * coefficients statistically significant at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a 
young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young 
firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are 
owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise; LABOR measures the 
difficulty for entrepreneurs of adjusting the labor force. LABOR = (hiring index + firing index + firing costs + rigidity of 
labor contracts + union density)/5. See Appendix I and Appendix II for the exact definition of the variables. 
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Table 5: Entrepreneurship, regulation and income 


















  TEA TEAOPP  TEANEC  TEA  TEAOPP  TEANEC  TEA TEAOPP  TEANEC 
               
AGE  0.0017*** 0.0012*** 0.0004**  0.0014**  0.0010**  0.0004**  0.0017*** 0.0012*** 0.0004* 
  (2.64) (2.61) (2.43) (2.17)  (2.20)  (2.40)  (2.99) (2.86) (1.68) 
AGE SQUARE  -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000***  -0.0000***  -0.0000**  -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000* 
FEMALE  -0.019*** -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.0175***  -0.0098***  -0.0044***  -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.004*** 
  (-5.07) (-3.95) (-4.16) (-8.25)  (-6.96)  (-5.05)  (-4.23) (-4.07) (-2.96) 
NOT WORKING  0.0010  -0.0048 0.0048  -0.0085  -0.0088***  0.0019  -0.0052 -0.0050**  0.0010 
  (0.16)  (-1.11) (1.31)  (-1.54)  (-2.95)  (0.61)  (-0.92) (-2.26) (0.22) 
STUDENTS  -0.0140* -0.0115* 0.0009  -0.0247***  -0.0178***  -0.0036  -0.0119  -0.0090  0.0006 
  (-1.66) (-1.73) (0.21)  (-3.96)  (-3.90)  (-1.22)  (-1.24) (-1.26) (0.14) 
RET. DIS  -0.032*** -0.022*** -0.0031  -0.0269***  -0.0186***  -0.0023  -0.0308** -0.0198** -0.0045 
  (-2.79) (-2.91) (-0.76) (-3.01)  (-3.13)  (-0.74)  (-2.48) (-2.50) (-1.03) 
HIGHSCHOOL -0.0032 0.0017  -0.0042**  -0.0011  0.0019  -0.0032**  -0.0002 0.0036  -0.0028 
  (-0.61) (0.44)  (-2.50) (-0.30)  (0.67)  (-2.04)  (-0.06) (0.99)  (-1.64) 
COLLEGE  0.0047 0.0074**  -0.0041*  0.0026  0.0049*  -0.0037**  0.0042 0.0078**  -0.0033** 
  (0.88) (2.00) (-1.91)  (0.64)  (1.68)  (-2.31)  (1.11) (2.53) (-2.79) 
KNOWENT  0.0554*** 0.0374*** 0.0081*** 0.0480***  0.0307***  0.0091***  0.0529*** 0.0357*** 0.0074*** 
  (14.78) (12.48) (5.29)  (17.40)  (15.41)  (6.61)  (17.26) (14.82) (5.46) 
SKILLS  0.0975*** 0.0667*** 0.0168*** 0.0906***  0.0649***  0.0143***  0.0839*** 0.0588*** 0.0132*** 
  (20.18) (20.66) (8.66)  (23.52)  (26.50)  (9.87)  (14.98) (22.55) (5.91) 
FEARFAIL  -0.018*** -0.014*** 0.0005  -0.0194***  -0.0153***  0.0003  -0.011*** -0.001*** 0.0022*** 
  (-3.87) (-4.11) (0.53)  (-4.91)  (-5.28)  (0.34)  (-3.51) (-4.28) (2.86) 
R*AGE -0.0011  -0.0011*  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0002  -0.0015**  -0.0013**  -0.0001 
  (-1.51) (-1.88) (-0.81) (-0.54)  (-1.16)  (-0.79)  (-2.13) (-2.44) (-1.08) 
R*FEMALE  0.0243 -0.0007  0.0130***  0.0275*** 0.0020  0.0124***  0.0054 -0.0060  0.0093*** 
  (1.62) (-0.07)  (2.92) (2.72)  (0.27)  (3.77)  (0.54) (-0.85)  (3.17) 
R*NOT WORK.  -0.077*** -0.0331*  -0.023*** -0.0564***  -0.0225  -0.0187***  -0.055*** -0.032*** -0.0138 
  (-4.29) (-1.93) (-3.38) (-3.57)  (-1.64)  (-2.93)  (-2.89) (-2.81) (-1.30) 
R*STUDENTS -0.0937**  -0.0406 -0.039***  -0.0448**  -0.0031  -0.0245**  -0.103***  -0.0526*  -0.039*** 
  (-2.57) (-1.28) (-3.40) (-1.96)  (-0.16)  (-2.51)  (-2.83) (-1.86) (-3.31) 
R* RET. DIS  0.0370 0.0506 -0.0090  -0.0033  0.0204  -0.0155  0.0261 0.0245 -0.0023 
  (0.72) (1.47) (-0.56)  (-0.08)  (0.76)  (-1.16)  (0.54) (0.78) (-0.15) 
R*HIGHSCHOOL  0.0105 0.0066 0.0074 0.0086  0.0095  0.0056  -0.0008  -0.0000  0.0029 
  (0.64) (0.64) (1.62) (0.49)  (0.89)  (1.22)  (-0.10)  (-0.00)  (0.61) 
R*COLLEGE  -0.0190 -0.0069 -0.0014 -0.0124  0.0032  -0.0035  -0.0156 -0.0073 -0.0042 
  (-1.07) (-0.68) (-0.17) (-0.70)  (0.33)  (-0.51)  (-1.63) (-0.95) (-1.00) 
R*KNOWENT  -0.039*** -0.027*** -0.0040  -0.0270***  -0.0115  -0.0077*  -0.0304** -0.021*** -0.0021 
  (-3.28) (-2.94) (-0.88) (-2.73)  (-1.44)  (-1.92)  (-2.55) (-2.79) (-0.46) 
R*SKILLS  -0.047*** -0.0261** -0.0079  -0.0409***  -0.0305***  -0.0032  -0.0124  -0.0071  0.0000 
  (-3.12) (-2.53) (-1.49) (-2.73)  (-3.25)  (-0.71)  (-0.91) (-0.94) (0.01) 
R*FEARFAIL  -0.0100 -0.0072 -0.0053*  -0.0042  -0.0030  -0.0054**  -0.035***  -0.023***  -0.011*** 
  (-0.72) (-0.65) (-1.83) (-0.32)  (-0.31)  (-2.12)  (-3.54) (-2.95) (-4.24) 
Lowest  Income  0.0004 0.0011 0.0025 -0.0012  -0.0024  0.0033***  0.0004 -0.0041  0.0050*** 
  (0.07) (0.27) (1.38) (-0.42)  (-0.96)  (3.34)  (0.08) (-1.33)  (2.80) 
Upper  Income -0.0091* -0.0044  -0.0036**  0.0005  0.0026  -0.0030***  -0.0076* -0.0030  -0.0035** 
  (-1.66) (-1.16) (-2.30) (0.10)  (0.76)  (-2.63)  (-1.76) (-1.10) (-2.40) 
R*Low  Income  0.0072 -0.0101  0.0009 0.0150  0.0025  -0.0014  0.0116 0.0096 -0.0049 
  (0.30) (-0.79)  (0.14) (0.80)  (0.18)  (-0.31)  (1.19) (1.28) (-1.53) 
R*Upp  Income  0.0549*** 0.0411*** 0.0043  0.0246  0.0205  0.0027  0.0459*** 0.0322*** 0.0044 
  (3.03) (3.07) (1.07) (1.20)  (1.47)  (0.62)  (3.45) (3.41) (0.93) 
OBSERVATIONS  122276 121769 120698 122276  121769  120698  119140 118653 117582 
Notes: Probit regressions including country fixed effects and time dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. Marginal effects (not coefficients) and t-stat. are shown in the tables. ***, **, * coefficients statistically significant at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a 
young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young 
firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are 
owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise; ENTRY measures the 
barriers and costs entrepreneurs face when they decide to create a new business; ENTRY = (procedures + time + cost + 
regulation (IEF))/4. CONTRACT measures the efficiency of the justice system in resolving commercial disputes; 
CONTRACT = (procedures + quality of bureaucracy)/2. LABOR measures the difficulty for entrepreneurs of adjusting the 
labor force. LABOR = (hiring index + firing index + firing costs + rigidity of labor contracts + union density)/5. See 
Appendix I and Appendix II for the exact definition of the variables. 
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Table 6: Entrepreneurship and regulation: evidence from the Flash Eurobarometer 





CONTRACT  R = LABOR  R = LABOR  R = LABOR 
  TEA TEAOPP  TEANEC TEA TEAOPP  TEANEC TEA TEAOPP  TEANEC 
           
AGE  -0.000089  0.007330*** 0.004457*** 0.001273  0.008547*** 0.005262*** 0.001083  0.007938*** 0.004972*** 
  (-0.07)  (4.00) (3.60) (1.17) (4.80) (4.54) (0.88) (5.37) (3.86) 
AGE SQUARE  -0.000034** -0.00008*** -0.00004*** -0.000037** -0.00008*** -0.00004*** -0.000038** -0.00009*** -0.00005*** 
  (-2.41) (-4.52) (-3.02) (-2.56) (-4.63) (-3.18) (-2.51) (-5.22) (-3.13) 
FEMALE  -0.04005*** -0.09299*** -0.04050*** -0.04053*** -0.07119*** -0.03757*** -0.04594*** -0.10174*** -0.03296*** 
  (-4.86) (-7.17) (-4.81) (-7.27) (-6.68) (-4.98) (-5.77) (-6.99) (-3.76) 
NOT WORKING  0.009715 -0.017990  0.001678 0.012157 -0.013903 -0.004663 0.006065 -0.015741  0.002709 
  (0.34) (-0.67)  (0.07) (0.99) (-0.96) (-0.42) (0.29) (-0.66)  (0.11) 
STUDENTS  0.026004 0.019790 0.032528 -0.036349**  -0.055110**  0.018021 0.033572 0.005737 0.015880 
  (0.79) (0.50) (0.82) (-2.03) (-2.57) (0.90) (1.31) (0.16) (0.40) 
RET. DIS  -0.041197**  -0.008437 -0.002658 -0.05203***  -0.028123**  -0.02301***  -0.05081***  -0.0471***  -0.02144*** 
  (-2.03) (-0.35) (-0.26) (-3.95) (-2.27) (-3.45) (-3.39) (-2.60) (-2.83) 
HIGHSCHOOL 0.020390  -0.019015 -0.006018 0.024281**  0.010078  -0.006696 0.033919  0.016906  0.026462 
  (1.02) (-1.40)  (-0.52)  (2.00) (0.82) (-1.12) (1.35) (1.03) (1.53) 
COLLEGE  0.041322**  -0.019708 0.024702* 0.047612***  0.019213  0.000663  0.053978***  0.033264* 0.041228* 
  (2.09) (-1.01)  (1.74) (3.72) (1.50) (0.08) (2.59) (1.72) (1.75) 
KNOWENT  0.030756*** 0.108556*** 0.014613  0.027173*** 0.076525*** 0.031865*** 0.029109*** 0.080674*** 0.001511 
  (2.91) (7.76) (1.46) (4.30) (6.91) (5.54) (3.24) (5.33) (0.15) 
FEARFAIL  -0.03047*** -0.05226*** -0.009229  -0.02473*** -0.04031*** -0.004764  -0.03324*** -0.03661*** -0.017823** 
  (-3.42) (-3.31) (-0.90) (-3.36) (-4.72) (-0.61) (-4.70) (-3.16) (-2.33) 
R*AGE  0.003495*  0.000166 0.001899 -0.000337 -0.003259*  -0.000526 0.000616 0.000830 0.000932 
  (1.69) (0.08) (1.52) (-0.31) (-1.68) (-0.55) (0.50) (0.65) (1.12) 
R*FEMALE  -0.002580  0.049213 0.043265*  -0.000641 -0.025704 0.037085**  0.010541 0.051975 0.015446 
  (-0.08)  (0.97) (1.86) (-0.02) (-0.63) (2.03) (0.50) (1.51) (0.79) 
R*NOT WORK.  -0.089421 -0.047220 -0.066691 -0.1059***  -0.066689 -0.047161*  -0.070444 -0.052964 -0.056499 
  (-1.05) (-0.57) (-1.04) (-2.80) (-1.38) (-1.76) (-1.33) (-0.88) (-1.05) 
R*STUDENTS  -0.24559*** -0.29041*** -0.211062** -0.031780  -0.021334  -0.19071*** -0.21378*** -0.190310** -0.126665 
  (-2.98) (-2.74) (-2.25) (-0.53) (-0.27) (-3.40) (-4.32) (-2.40) (-1.31) 
R* RET. DIS  -0.015639 -0.108904 -0.11587***  0.059530  -0.029452 -0.038155 0.037028  0.030218  -0.037098 
  (-0.20) (-1.08) (-4.13) (0.95)  (-0.46) (-1.32) (0.79)  (0.51)  (-1.57) 
R*HIGHSCHOOL  -0.028136 0.102267**  0.000387  -0.049622 0.007268  -0.003207 -0.057882 -0.008891 -0.082123** 
  (-0.52) (2.41)  (0.01)  (-1.38) (0.18)  (-0.19) (-1.06) (-0.22) (-2.18) 
R*COLLEGE  -0.019051 0.158038***  -0.089565**  -0.044914 0.029434  -0.023256 -0.041490 -0.007041 -0.105944** 
  (-0.35) (2.76)  (-2.27) (-1.22) (0.75)  (-0.84) (-0.97) (-0.17) (-2.35) 
R*KNOWENT -0.008938 -0.15843***  0.014256  0.003508  -0.085465**  -0.03482***  -0.004975 -0.067928*  0.043378** 
  (-0.35) (-4.29) (0.61)  (0.17)  (-2.29) (-2.64) (-0.25) (-1.88) (1.97) 
R*FEARFAIL 0.040639 0.073837 -0.006364  0.024288 0.038357 -0.022928 0.039216**  0.015569 0.019748 
  (1.26) (1.44) (-0.21)  (0.87) (1.26) (-1.04) (2.22) (0.47) (0.92) 
R  -0.069532 -0.169835 -0.075221 -0.026147 0.021280  0.135216**  0.007363  -0.038774 0.015832 
  (-0.52) (-0.82) (-0.68) (-0.46) (0.18)  (2.08)  (0.08)  (-0.22) (0.21) 
OBSERVATIONS  26355 26355 26355 26355 26355 26355 25349 25349 25349 
Notes: Probit regressions including country fixed effects and time dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. Marginal effects (not coefficients) and t-stat. are shown in the tables. ***, **, * coefficients statistically significant at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a 
young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young 
firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are 
owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 otherwise; ENTRY measures the 
barriers and costs entrepreneurs face when they decide to create a new business; ENTRY = (procedures + time + cost + 
regulation (IEF))/4. CONTRACT measures the efficiency of the justice system in resolving commercial disputes; 
CONTRACT = (procedures + quality of bureaucracy)/2. LABOR measures the difficulty for entrepreneurs of adjusting the 
labor force. LABOR = (hiring index + firing index + firing costs + rigidity of labor contracts + union density)/5. See 
Appendix I and Appendix III for the exact definition of the variables. 
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Table 7: Entrepreneurship and regulation – Instrumental variables estimation (weighted data) 


















  TEA TEAOPP  TEANEC  TEA  TEAOPP  TEANEC  TEA TEAOPP  TEANEC 
               
AGE  0.0017*  0.0013** 0.0003  0.0016*  0.0011*  0.0004  0.0019** 0.0015** 0.0003 
  (1.96) (2.13) (0.88) (1.86)  (1.86)  (1.15)  (2.39) (2.70) (0.87) 
AGE SQUARE  -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000*  -0.0000***  -0.0000***  -0.0000*  -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0000* 
  (-3.09) (-3.08) (-1.86) (-3.03)  (-2.95)  (-1.88)  (-3.42) (-3.40) (-1.96) 
FEMALE  -0.033*** -0.021*** -0.010*** -0.0272***  -0.0172***  -0.0086***  -0.029*** -0.018*** -0.009*** 
  (-5.50) (-4.51) (-3.50) (-6.08)  (-4.84)  (-3.20)  (-5.70) (-4.20) (-4.54) 
NOT WORKING  -0.0070 -0.0108 0.0039  -0.0102  -0.0103  0.0004  -0.0102 -0.0133**  0.0030 
  (-0.58) (-1.45) (0.54)  (-1.07)  (-1.62)  (0.08)  (-1.05) (-2.07) (0.48) 
STUDENTS -0.028***  -0.026***  0.0003  -0.0345***  -0.0313***  -0.0004  -0.0238*  -0.0202*  -0.0015 
  (-2.94) (-3.39) (0.04)  (-4.09)  (-4.66)  (-0.08)  (-1.85) (-1.87) (-0.14) 
RET. DIS  -0.037*** -0.036*** 0.0028  -0.0348***  -0.0324***  0.0009  -0.044*** -0.040*** 0.0001 
  (-2.87) (-3.16) (0.62)  (-3.11)  (-3.12)  (0.27)  (-3.12) (-3.28) (0.03) 
HIGHSCHOOL  0.0136 0.0150**  -0.0013  0.0115  0.0115**  0.0008  0.0043 0.0095*  -0.0055 
  (1.34) (2.12) (-0.21)  (1.59)  (2.25)  (0.17)  (0.54) (1.73) (-0.91) 
COLLEGE  0.0190*  0.0197*** -0.0010  0.0164**  0.0170***  -0.0001  0.0077  0.0147*** -0.0081 
  (1.97) (3.44) (-0.15)  (2.34)  (4.00)  (-0.03)  (0.97) (4.07) (-1.38) 
KNOWENT  0.0884*** 0.0809*** 0.0028  0.0743***  0.0663***  0.0043  0.0950*** 0.0838*** 0.0061* 
  (7.45) (8.01) (0.76) (7.14)  (7.35)  (1.45)  (13.75)  (13.87)  (1.94) 
SKILLS  0.1045*** 0.0879*** 0.0123*  0.1003***  0.0840***  0.0120***  0.1050*** 0.0823*** 0.0178** 
  (5.57) (6.06) (2.02) (6.93)  (7.44)  (3.12)  (5.36) (5.72) (2.48) 
FEARFAIL  -0.022*** -0.024*** 0.0026  -0.0242***  -0.0244***  0.0012  -0.022*** -0.024*** 0.0017 
  (-4.21) (-5.76) (1.27)  (-5.69)  (-7.07)  (0.83)  (-5.26) (-6.12) (0.90) 
R*AGE  -0.0006 -0.0009 0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0007  0.0002  -0.0009 -0.0010 0.0004 
  (-0.50) (-0.97) (0.81)  (-0.39)  (-0.80)  (0.58)  (-0.79) (-1.18) (0.81) 
R*FEMALE  0.0606**  0.0237 0.0312**  0.0578**  0.0172  0.0357**  0.0381*  0.0126 0.0218*** 
  (2.27) (1.24) (2.28) (2.05)  (0.83)  (2.12)  (2.01) (0.82) (2.73) 
R*NOT WORK.  -0.0654 -0.0261 -0.0327 -0.0781*  -0.0397  -0.0308  -0.0433 -0.0133 -0.0242 
  (-1.50) (-0.95) (-1.38) (-1.83)  (-1.34)  (-1.35)  (-1.24) (-0.61) (-1.31) 
R*STUDENTS -0.0718 -0.0339 -0.0374 -0.0682  -0.0242  -0.0456  -0.0773 -0.0485 -0.0280 
  (-1.56) (-1.09) (-1.28) (-1.35)  (-0.68)  (-1.67)  (-1.60) (-1.41) (-0.81) 
R* RET. DIS  0.0350 0.0648*  -0.0327  0.0355  0.0703*  -0.0368*  0.0545 0.0717**  -0.0211 
  (0.78) (1.72) (-1.66)  (0.74)  (1.74)  (-1.71)  (1.32) (2.16) (-1.23) 
R*HIGHSCHOOL  -0.0449 -0.0350 -0.0078 -0.0529*  -0.0327  -0.0200  -0.0151 -0.0171 0.0051 
  (-1.51) (-1.59) (-0.42) (-1.86)  (-1.46)  (-1.08)  (-0.76) (-1.17) (0.35) 
R*COLLEGE  -0.0607*  -0.0297 -0.0293 -0.0712**  -0.0269  -0.0451*  -0.0205 -0.0134 -0.0030 
  (-1.94) (-1.47) (-1.18) (-2.50)  (-1.21)  (-1.88)  (-0.91) (-1.01) (-0.18) 
R*KNOWENT  -0.110*** -0.124*** 0.0208  -0.0886*  -0.1070**  0.0228  -0.116*** -0.116*** 0.0080 
  (-2.99) (-4.12) (1.58)  (-1.85)  (-2.69)  (1.61)  (-5.39) (-6.56) (0.84) 
R*SKILLS  -0.0577 -0.0706*  0.0147  -0.0625  -0.0835**  0.0230  -0.0504 -0.0435 -0.0039 
  (-1.14) (-1.81) (0.70)  (-1.15)  (-2.04)  (1.18)  (-1.06) (-1.23) (-0.20) 
R*FEARFAIL  -0.0221 -0.0047 -0.0154*  -0.0186  -0.0014  -0.0155*  -0.0193 -0.0065 -0.0108* 
  (-1.07) (-0.32) (-1.74) (-0.76)  (-0.08)  (-1.73)  (-1.35) (-0.59) (-1.69) 
OBSERVATIONS  166857 166181 166181 166857  166181  166181  163507 162851 162851 
Notes: IV regressions including country fixed effects and time dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. 
Instruments for the regulatory variable R are dummy variables measuring English (common law), French (civil law), 
Socialist, German and Scandinavian legal origin. Coefficients and t-stat. are shown in the tables. ***, **, * coefficients 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. TEA = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are 
owners and managers of a young firm, 0 otherwise; TEAOPP = 1 if individuals are starting a new business or are owners 
and managers of a young firm to take advantage of a business opportunity, 0 otherwise; TEANEC = 1 if individuals are 
starting a new business or are owners and managers of a young firm because they could find no better economic work, 0 
otherwise. ENTRY measures the barriers and costs entrepreneurs face when they decide to create a new business; ENTRY 
= (procedures + time + cost + regulation (IEF))/4. CONTRACT measures the efficiency of the justice system in resolving 
commercial disputes; CONTRACT = (procedures + quality of bureaucracy)/2. LABOR measures the difficulty for 
entrepreneurs of adjusting the labor force. LABOR = (hiring index + firing index + firing costs + rigidity of labor contracts 
+ union density)/5. See Appendix I and Appendix II for the exact definitions of the variables. 
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4.4 3.6 1.8 3.4
Domestic versus global markets 
Figure 2: Opportunity entrepreneurs, necessity entrepreneurs and their business activities
TEAOPP (%) TEANEC (%)